Predictability of the possible avenues of human error is important for designing error recovery mechanisms in systems' interfaces. Our approach for modeling errors during the taxiing and pre-flight phase, involves using Hollnagel's (1 993) Contextual Control Model (CoCoM). Hollnagel postulates that changes in the human's operational context make her switch control modes or cognitive strategies. Previously, Verma & Corker (2002) encoded rules to implement CoCoM for Air Traffic Controllers (ATCo) in the Air-MIDAS (Man-Machine Integrated Design and Analysis System) architecture. They defined the operational context as the number of simultaneous goals and the event horizon time required to successfully complete those goals, and also encoded behavior associated with three types of cognitive strategies-unplanned, tactical, and strategic. In this study, new sets of rules are being coded for the pilots, such that changes in the context will cause the simulated operator to change cognitive strategies. The dependent variables of interest are cognitive strategies used by pilot-agents, workload, status of tasks (completed, aborted, working), and consequences of errors performed.
INTRODUCTION
Technological systems are all pervasive and are growing in levels of complexity. Human interaction with the automation is often identified as the weak link in the integrity of these interactive systems, irrespective of the level of complexity. Human error is likely to the extent that the system poses resource-demand constraints on the human operator. Different approaches, ranging from taxonomies to cognitive modeling to understanding and modeling such "error" have been propounded by various researchers.
Modeling Errors
The most intuitively appealing approach to modeling errors has been the limited rationality approach (Woods, 1988) . The limited rationality approach assumes that people are doing reasonable things, given their knowledge, perspective, and other limited resources -knowledge, processing ability, time, or workload. Therefore an error is a result of mismatches between the demand a problem poses and the resources available to handle it (Rasmussen, 1986) . From the perspective of a joint cognitive system or a personmachine system, error is a symptom, or manifestation, of flaws in such a system.
The cognitive modeling approach requires mapping cognitive demands imposed by a problem situation, that any intelligent agent with limited resources would have to solve. The sources of error that may need to be modeled depend upon missing, incomplete or erroneous knowledge, and inert knowledge. The erroneous knowledge can be modeled based on information obtained by empirical research. "Inert knowledge" means that knowledge is present but does not get activated in the given context. Thus, the critical factor in modeling inert knowledge is not whether domain knowledge exists but whether that situation-relevant knowledge can be accessed under the conditions in which the task is performed.
Cognitive strategies for coping with high workload, used by a limited-resource problem-solver, also have a strong effect on accessibility of knowledge. Wiegmann & Shappell(2001) used cognitive models for error analyses and elucidated the limitations of the cognitive models used for error analysis. They explain that, other than the absence of exact procedures for using cognitive models for error analysis, cognitive models do not typically address contextual or task related factors such as equipment design, or physical factors such as fatigue. As a result, they may focus solely on the operator as the cause of error. With this pitfall in mind, error analysis in the current study focuses on contextual factors and their impact on cognitive strategies for pilots.
human performance model, Air MIDAS, for pilots taxiing in to the Chicago O'Hare airport (Gore, Verma, Jadhav, Delnegro, & Corker, 2001 ). In the cognitive modeling effort, the researchers mapped the working memory and attentional resource constraints with the demand exerted on them by the situation to predict erroneous situations. Gore et al. (2001) modeled errors arising due to decay of the ATC clearance information in the working memory and forgetting, that occurs from memory capacity limitations i.e. interference. The limitation of this approach was that contextual factors were not addressed to study error. As a result, the current modeling effort will focus on inclusion of Contextual Control Model (CoCoM) in Air-MIDAS.
Hollnagel(l993) postulated a theoretical model of human cognition, Contextual Control Model (CoCoM) in which human operators change cognitive strategies based on context or situation. CoCoM asserts that actions are determined by context and the human's response to that context, rather than an inherent relation between actions. CoCoM is comprised of a model of competence and a model of control. The former is concerned with the skills and ability of the human operator. The model of control is concerned with planning action in the immediate future. Hollnagel defines In a previous study, human error was modeled in the four levels of control -Scrambled, Opportunistic, Tactical, and Strategic. The levels of control are different in terms of the degree of planning done in each of these control modes.
We define Scrambled mode as being marked with zero planning or random selection of activities. The Opportunistic mode is concerned with the salient features of the interface, but planning is restricted to the present context. There is more planning in the Tactical mode, but it is of limited scope, whereas in the Strategic mode the operator is actually acting out well-formed goals and intentions. According to Hollnagel (1 993), some of the variables that affect the context and control mode are number of simultaneous goals, event horizon (look-ahead time), availability of plans, and modes of execution. Only number of simultaneous goals and eventhorizon were incorporated into Air-MIDAS (verma ).
Hollnagel (1 995) indicates that there are genotypes (causes) and phenotypes (consequences) for error analysis based on cognitive models. The phenotypes are specific to the application domain; for example, forgetting to apply thrust in aircraft has specific consequences. But some genotypes can be application independent. They can be represented as cognitive hctions, such as cognitive strategies or control modes under which the agent operates, and these are the same irrespective of the domain. The purpose of this modeling effort will be to analyze the phenotypes or consequences of error under different cognitive strategies or control modes for performing risk analysis under varying contextual conditions. and Error Analysis Method (CREAM), Hollnagel(l995) describes performance reliability as the probability that a person will perform according to the requirements of the tasks for a specified period of time. He also defines error modes or basic phenotypes, which are categories that describe the manifestations of errors. For instance, a timing error mode will mean that the action took place too early or too late, or distance error mode will mean that the distance is too far or too short.
It is hypothesized, based on Hollnagel (1 995) that performance reliability will co-vary with level of control a person has over the situation. The low control situation (such as unplanned mode) will have poor performance reliability, whereas the situations with higher control (like strategic mode) will improve performance reliability to an extent and after a certain point performance reliability will taper off. Hollnagel explains that tapering of reliability occurs because too much time may be spent in thinking and planning, hence a less than optimally smooth routine performance may be observed.
performance model must be able to detect conditions under which errors occur. Some of these errors include failures to revise situation assessments, failures of selective attention, confirmation bias in hypothesis evaluation, "strong but wrong" forms based on matching bias (Reason, 1990) , lapses or slips of actions (Norman, 1981) , mode errors, and many others. These descriptive taxonomies are a first step to modeling error in human performance models.
In another methodology called Cognitive Reliability
Thus to address the avenues of errors, a human
Human Performance Model-Air MIDAS
The current research describes development of an error context model in the Human Performance Model-Air MIDAS (Man Machine Integrated Design and Analysis). Air MIDAS has been used to research the interaction between the human and automation in joint cognitive systems mostly for military and aviation applications (for detailed discussion see Corker 2000) .
Air MIDAS is an agent-based object-oriented system with various human constructs or functions like memory, attention, perception, and task scheduling represented within it. There is also an internal (to the model) representation of the external world in the form of equipment, and terrain, with which the human agent interacts. A closed loop control behavior is modeled, where the inputs received from the world are sensed, perceived, and attended to by the human agent. The information is then used to think, memorize, decide and choose actions, that in turn change the world, and the cycle continues (See Figure 1) . Incoming world information is represented by declarative memory structures forming context. This is the basis of actions taken by the agent that, in turn, change the external world. The interaction between context and tasks represents human behavior.
Modeling the effects of context in MIDAS involved a computational implementation of Hollnagel's (1 993) contextual control model ). The original version of MIDAS did not have a context-control switching mechanism. The human agent's scheduler behavior simply performed tasks based on their priority, if resources were available. If resources were not available then activities were deferred or dropped depending on time passage. The availability of resources is assessed by using task loads assigned to each activity. The resources are not limited to availability of time; the model also employs a set of tabled demand values for different tasks ranging from 0 to 7. These values were generated by expert pilots and compiled by Aldrich, Craddock, and McCracken (1984) . For example, activities like "monitor, scan, and survey" have a task demand level of 1; and "read, decipher text, decode" have a level of 7.
The theory of multiplicity of processing resources is considered for scheduler behavior. Four "channels" are used to implement the theoretical constraints on human processing resources. These are taken in our implementation to beVisual, Auditory, Cognitive and PsychoMotor. Within each channel simultaneous demands are summed, and tasks whose collective demand are less than "7" are scheduled and executed. Tasks that are interrupted by higher priority activities may move into a pending queue, if resources are still not available they may be dropped. A context-control switching mechanism, in addition to task loads, considers the number of simultaneous goals and the decision horizon to select different sets of activities corresponding to a control mode.
The context-control switching mechanism is a function of a control mode switch parameter, which is mapped to different control modes and cognitive strategies. Only three control modes were encoded for this study: scrambled (unplanned), tactical and strategic modes. The tactical and opportunistic modes are not too distinct and the two modes could not be separately implemented in MIDAS, due to similarity in rules between the two. This parameter is calculated from the number of tasks or goals to be performed and the decision horizon available to complete the goal. Thus a metric -goals per unit time -is computed from current number of goals and temporal horizon. The switching parameter values are domain specific and are determined with help of experts in that domain. For example, event horizons for en route ATCo are determined from the number of aircraft in the sector, and the size of the sector ). The estimated parameter switches control modes, for example at 2 goals/ sec in strategic mode or 10 goals/ sec in scrambled mode. The behavior in the scrambled or unplanned control modes is rather random. The behavior in tactical mode is based on Reason's frequency matching theory where frequently thought of tasks are scheduled more often. The strategic mode takes all preconditions and consequences into eonsideration before planning or performing those activities..
METHODOLOGY
The error modeling effort focused on understanding performance reliability, or levels of errors, expected for every control mode. The scenario designed for this modeling task was at Schiphol airport in Amsterdam which has crossing runways separately used for taxiing and departing traffic. The scenario consisted of one aircraft taking off and another taxiing across the runway. Thus modeling development was undertaken in two steps, procedural development for the taxiing and take-off tasks, and implementation of CoCoM for the pilot agent. Procedural development involved performing task decomposition using GOMS (Goals Operators Methods and Selection) methodology (Kieras, 1997) for the four agents-pilot flying (PF) and pilot-not-flying (PNF) for takeoff aircraft, and pilot-flying (PF) and pilot-not-flying (PNF) for taxiing aircraft. Also extensive rules on when the aircraft crossed the threshold of visibility with respect to the crossing runways, and any levels of noise that impede the visibility process, were also encoded. There is a potential for error, if either of the pilot-agents do not detect the other aircraft or miss the incursion altogether.
The implementation of CoCoM for the pilot agent was based on the re-definition of the event or decision horizon. The procedural model we used was that pilots are required to complete tasks within a fixed duration of time or altitude, for example landing or approach activities. As a consequence their event horizon will be different for different phases of flight. Using the distance traveled and the speed of the aircraft, event-horizon or "look-ahead times" were computed for taxiing and departing aircraft. For instance, the event horizon for the taking-off aircraft from the far end of the runway to the point of achieving VI velocity was computed as 33 sec, based on the initial velocity of 0 and constant acceleration of 2 m/sec*. This value is then fed into the metric-"look-ahead time per goal" to decide the control mode for the operator. Whenever the metric -"look-ahead time per goal" is less than 5 sec per goal the control mode is unplanned, the mode switches to tactical as the metric value is in the 6 to 11 sec per goal range, and an increase in the look-ahead time to greater than 12 sec per goal makes the control mode strategic.
RESULTS & DISCUSSION
Our results and discussion will address first, the verification of the control mode behavior, and then provide description of a methodology to address consequences of errors, or phenotypes, under different control modes. The verification section is based on the full data set of 20 runs whereas the consequences of errors section examines specific runs in detail providing a qualitative analysis.
Verification
Model verification deals with building the model right (Banks, 1998) . It evaluates that the transformation from problem formulation to model specification to model implementation was accurate. We attempt to verify the model based on past research work and ensure that our implementation logic is accurate. The process of verification of control mode behavior is based on estimated workload and percentage of activities or goals completed for every control mode for the pilot-flying (PF) in both the take-off and taxiing aircraft. The percentage of activities completed graphs verified the basic hctionality of the control mode switcher-to switch modes. The workload estimates are shown in Figures 1 and 2. visual and cognitive loads decrease as the planning mode changes from strategic to tactical to unplanned. The auditory and psychomotor loads are approximately the same for strategic and unplanned mode. The auditory load is least and motor load is highest for the tactical mode, this is mostly due to the nature of activities performed in tactical mode. Previous research on CoCoM implementation for ATCo (Verma, 2001) found similar results with strategic mode experiencing higher workload. There it was discussed that ATCo are trained to act in the strategic mode though the operational context does not
The workload levels for PF-takeoff show that the always support the strategic form of cognitive behavior. Lower levels of workload were observed in the unplanned mode because the agent adopts less information intensive strategies like random performance of tasks, shedding tasks etc. to lower workload. show increasing visual workload as planning modes change. It is interesting to note that all other types of workloads dip in the tactical mode before increasing considerably in the unplanned mode. Also, unplanned mode experiences increased workload over the strategic mode, as may be expected. Tactical mode is described as the optimum mode for performance reliability by Hollnagel(l995). It is often described as the cognitive strategy where performance may be skill-based, as per Rasmussen (1 986), or routine-habitual activities.
takeoff is shown in Figure 3 . On an average the percentage of activities or goals completed in strategic mode is higher than that (refers to percentage) in the unplanned mode, showing that there is improved performance reliability in the higher control modes like tactical or strategic modes (Hollnagel, 1995) . This idea is reinforced by the fact that the percentage of aborted activities is the same in the two modes, which depicts that similar level of interruptions or time pressure may be experienced in both the modes. The activities remembered or method implemented to change performance, a common problem in discrete event modeling. The control mode switcher is a discrete ratio that leads to sudden, radical changes in modeled agent behavior. Contributory to this methodological problem is the definition of decision horizon, which is based on predicted rather than actual times required for performance.
The PF-taxiing (Figure 4) shows that a higher These data illustrate a common problem in the 
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Consequences of Errors
This section describes a methodology to analyze the consequences of errors. An example of how to perform such an analysis is discussed here. The basic error modes or failure modes are examined, by selecting specific simulation runs for analysis. Overall, the takeoff-aircraft aborted its takeoff in 10% of the total runs based on the crew spotting the taxiing aircraft on the crossing runway. Similarly, taxiing aircraft initiated braking 10% of times after the flight crew agent correctly received communication from the ATCo-agent to stop. The minimum distance reached between the aircraft, measured as the hypotenuse between the two was too short, was 3 1 m (possibly a near miss). This can be considered as a distance error mode-distance too short between the two aircraft, where the taxiing aircraft stopped, but takeoff aircraft did not. Further analyses of this particular run showed that the Pilot taking off spotted the aircraft, checked his aircraft's velocity and found that the velocity was more than V2, and therefore decided not to stop. The Pilot taking off agent probably noticed the aircraft on the taxiway too late (timing error: action at wrong time). The Pilot taxiing was in strategic mode when it received communication to stop. The agent Pilot taxiing took only 11.2 sec to stop after she received ATCo communication. Also once the taxiing-aircraft stopped much of the time pressure experienced earlier was relieved and the agent continued to operate in the strategic mode. In the strategic mode, it completed as much of the taxiing-checklists as was possible before termination conditions of the simulation were met, and thereby improved performance reliability.
CONCLUSION
The present research successfully implemented the CoCoM model for pilot agent in a flight deck domain for a taxiing operation. The rules encoded for control mode switcher were verified by the data that showed switching of modes did occur according to the control logic implemented. In terms of performance reliability, highest percentage of tasks or goals was completed in the strategic mode, but higher workloads were also estimated in the same mode. This might suggest that the modeled agent attempts to remain in the strategic mode, even though the operational context does not support it.
Further research is suggested in using fuzzy logic or interval mathematics to avoid problems associated with the discrete control mode switcher. Also the validation of this model using Human In The Loop (HITL) research methodology is recommended.
